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A BARGAINING FRAMEWORK TO ESTABLISH OVER-ORDER 
PREMIUMS IN DAIRY MARKETS 
 
 
As a result of economies of scale, most food processors are often large and few by nature 
(Durham and Sexton, 1992). These characteristics put processors at a bargaining 
advantage over independent farmers. Marketing cooperatives were established to counter 
the uneven bargaining position of individual farmers. In general, a cooperative of a given 
commodity usually negotiates with several processors (Iskow and Sexton, 1991). 
However, a cooperative often first bargains with a leading firm in the industry or region, 
and an agreement with other processors will be close to the initial outcome (Sexton, 
1993). This structure indicates an approximate bilateral monopoly (Sexton, 1993). 
Unfortunately, the equilibrium in a bilateral monopoly cannot theoretically be determined 
by traditional economic tools. The supply and demand framework can define only the 
bargaining price range that contains the solution outcome (Helmberger and Chavas, 
1996). The precise price level is defined by other non-economic factors, such as 
bargaining skills or their attitude toward risk.  
Theoretic analyses of bilateral bargaining are categorized into static axiomatic and 
strategic approaches (Krishna and Serrano, 1996). The static axiomatic approach was first 
proposed by Nash (1950). The Nash axiomatic approach has been popular in the 
empirical works as it is simple to implement, and can be interpreted as a stable bargaining 
convention which is immune to a particular argument presented by an arbitrary player 
(Coles and Hildreth, 2000; Muthoo, 1999). On the other hand, the strategic approach was 
initially introduced by Rubinstein (1982), who suggested the alternative-offer procedure 3 
and the idea of friction (i.e., the value of time) to the bargaining process. Then, Binmore, 
Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) introduced the risk of breakdown into the Rubinstein 
alternative-offer bargaining model.  
The axiomatic and strategic approaches are closely related. The results from the 
Rubinstein strategic model and the strategic model with the risk of breakdown 
approximate the solution suggested by Nash’s model, when the response time between 
the parties during the game is small (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky; 1986). Indeed, 
the Nash bargaining model is a special case of more elaborate strategic models that 
converge to the Nash model under certain assumptions (Burtraw, 1993) (for more 
examples, see Binmore (1987a, 1987b, 1987c)). Furthermore, van Damme (1986) found 
that all solution bargaining concepts within a large class (meta-game) leads to the 
axiomatic Nash bargaining solution. 
The Florida Milk Marketing Cooperative (MMC) and fluid milk processors reach 
contract agreements through a monthly bargaining process that approximates a bilateral 
monopoly as cited in Sexton (1993). The MMC and one processor (sometimes two 
processors) bargain over the dollar amount above the Class I price known as an over-
order premium. The bargaining results are accepted by the other processors. This 
bargaining process will be analyzed in this article. 
The article is organized as follows. First, a strategic bargaining model that leads 
to the generalized axiomatic Nash bargaining model for the Florida dairy market is 
introduced. Second, the model is specified for a risk averse attitude situation. Third, the 4 
projection of over-order premiums and results from the sensitivity analysis are presented. 
Finally, our summary, conclusions, and implications for this article are provided. 
A Strategic Bargaining Model for Florida Dairy Pricing 
The MCC and the processing plant bargain over a fluid milk price per hundredweight. 
This bargaining process is characterized using the game-theoretic alternating bargaining 
model originally proposed by Rubinstein (1982), and further discussed in studies by 
Binmore et al. (1986), Binmore (1992), Binmore et al. (1998), Coles and Wright (1998), 
Muthoo (1999), Coles and Hildreth (2000), Furusawa and Wen (2002). This alternating 
bargaining model is a game-theoretic model. Therefore, the analysis involves 
characterizing the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game-theorectic strategic 
bargaining model as an equilibrium point for this model (Muthoo, 1999).  
At time 0, the MMC (or the processor) makes an offer p1. The processing plant 
may either accept the price p1 or reject it. If the processing plant accepts the MMC’s 
offer, then they have reached an agreement and the MMC will sell the fluid milk to the 
processing plant at $p1 per hundredweight. If the processor is not satisfied with p1, then 
the processor will propose (counteroffer) the price p2 to the MMC at time ∆, where ∆ > 0. 
If the MMC agrees with this counteroffer p2, then this negotiation process is finished. But 
if not, then the MMC will make a counter-counteroffer price p3 back to the processor at 
time 2∆. The alternating-offer process goes on until either party accepts a price offer 
proposed by the other party.  
In this proposed bargaining procedure, it appears that the MMC makes offers at 
time 0, 2∆, 4∆, 6∆…etc, while the processing plant makes offers at time ∆, 3∆, 5∆, 5 
7∆…etc. The reverse argument above is true if the processor makes the first price offer. 
Moreover, during a negotiation process there is a possibility that the bargaining process 
ends due to a random event, which once happened in the early 1980’s when the 
bargaining process broke down. This breakdown in a bargaining process is rare but 
possible, and if it happens, then the MMC will sell fluid milk elsewhere and tends to 
receive a lower price than it should receive from the processor. Similarly, the processing 
plant will buy milk elsewhere with a potentially higher price than a price paid to the 
MMC. The breakdown results in preventing both parties from having mutual benefits 
from their cooperation.  
Binmore et al. (1986) suggested that the time of breakdown can be modeled as an 
exponential distribution with parameter λ. Then, the probability that the bargaining 
process will terminate in each bargaining period of ∆ is p = 1-exp(-λ∆). Based on a 
property of the exponential distribution (related to the Poisson distribution), parameter λ 
can be interpreted as the expected number of breakdowns per unit of time (Hiller and 
Lieberman, 1995). The parameter λi could be different between parties, based on the rate 
of breakdown expected by the MMC and processing plant.  
As proved by Binmore et. al. (1986), the perfect equilibrium point of the risk of 
breakdown model is reached at time t = 0. If the MMC is the one who moves first, the 
MMC will propose the price offer  , which is accepted by the processor. Likewise, if 
the processor is the one who moves first, the processor will propose the price offer  , 





offer model with arbitrarily small ∆s as the most compelling model. In the real situation, 
the MMC and processor are not required to move on a strict timetable (i.e., ∆, 2∆, 
3∆…etc). Given that either the MMC or processor just rejected a price offer, the 
reasonable thing to do is to propose a counteroffer as soon as possible. Due to a risk of 
breakdown, waiting to make a counteroffer could be costly (i.e. a breakdown might occur 
at any time) (Binmore, 1992). Thus, the use of a small ∆ is assumed in this analysis. 
Moreover, when ∆ approaches zero, the outcome from this strategic model converges to 
the outcome from the generalized Nash bargaining model (Muthoo, 1999).  
The generalized Nash bargaining model (Muthoo, 1999) for the price negotiation 
between the MMC and the Florida processor can be shown as 
(1)       
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where Uc and Up are the utility functions for the MMC and the processor respectively; 
Ubc and Ubp are the MMC’s utility and the processor’s utility when a breakdown occurs; 
α and (1-α) denote the MMC’s and the processor’s relative bargaining powers. Both 
parties have equal bargaining power if α equals 0.5. The disagreement point (d1, d2) in 
the generalized Nash model is represented by the breakdown points (Ubc, Ubp) from the 
strategic bargaining model (Binmore et al., 1986; and Muthoo, 1999). The Nash 




A Risk Averse Generalized Axiomatic Nash Bargaining Model 
Since risk aversion is the most common attitude toward risk (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 
1998), both the MMC and the processing plant are assumed to be risk-averse with a 
negative exponential functional form 
( 2 )       U  
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where θ  is the Pratt-Arrow absolute risk aversion coefficient, and π is a payoff or wealth 
to a player. The Pratt-Arrow absolute risk aversion θ(π), initially developed by Pratt 
(1964), is defined as 
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The Pratt-Arrow absolute risk aversion θ(π) is a measurement of risk level because the 
feature of a risk-averse individual is a diminishing marginal utility of wealth (i.e., 
0 ) ( < ′ ′ π U ) (Nicholson, 2000). Higher values of θ indicate more risk aversion for an 
individual and θ equal zero indicates risk neutrality. 
The negative exponential utility function is the most commonly used risk attitude 
measure in empirical studies (for example, see Rister, Skees, and Black, 1984; Raskin 
and Cochran, 1986; McSweeny and Kramer, 1986; Babcock, Chalfant, and Collender, 
1987; Featherstone and Moss, 1990; Love and Buccola, 1991; Babcock, Choi, and 
Feinerman, 1993; Wang, Dorfman, McKissick, and Turner, 2001). This utility function 
exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), which measures the degree of risk 
aversion exhibited by a utility function and also has the von Neumann-Morgenstern’s 
utility properties. A CARA decision maker requires the constant risk premium regardless 8 
of sizes of the decision maker’s wealth (Robinson and Barry, 1987). A CARA decision 
maker has no wealth effect in the attitude toward risk (Binger and Hoffman, 1998). The 
CARA characteristic implies a constant level of risk aversion for a certain value of θ 
regardless of the size of initial wealth π. When risk aversion is concerned, both the MMC 
and processor are assumed to exhibit CARA because the wealth of the MMC and 
processor do not fluctuate from one month to the next. Furthermore, the analysis for 
various levels of risk aversion is done by changing θ in the utility function. Greater 
values of θ indicate more risk aversion for an individual.  
  Using the negative exponential utility function in a bargaining analysis with risk 
aversion, the MMC and processor’s utility functions are modeled as 
(4)       
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where  θc  (θp)  is the Pratt-Arrow absolute risk aversion coefficient for the MMC 
(processor); p is the price per hundredweight of fluid milk, c denotes the total cost per 
hundredweight faced by the cooperative, and r represents the processor’s revenue minus 
other costs associated with milk processing per hundredweight of fluid milk; and pbc (pbp) 
is the fluid milk price per hundredweight received by the MMC (paid by the processor) if 
the negotiation process breaks down.  9 
Assuming that both the MMC and processor are risk-averse where θc and θp are 
the Pratt-Arrow absolute risk aversion coefficients of the MMC and processor 
respectively, the generalized Nash bargaining model can be written as 
(6)   . 
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Differentiating equation (6) with respect to p
N and setting it equal to zero results in  
(7)   0 )
1 1































c e e e







The explicit form of p
N  cannot be solved using the algebraic method. After 
knowing values of parameters and given other variables, p
N in equation (7) can be solved 
by a numerical method. 
Surplus and Deficit Periods 
Due to the weather conditions in Florida, there exist periods of milk shortage and surplus. 
The MMC is responsible for balancing the supply and demand of fluid milk. In deficit 
months, the MMC buys milk from out-of state producers and imports it into Florida for 
the Florida processors. While, in surplus months, the excess supply is shipped out of 
Florida as Class III and IV milk and sold to butter, cheese and/or powdered milk 
manufacturers. 
In surplus months, the average price received by the MMC is usually less than the 
price received in the deficit months (Federal Milk Marketing Statistics). The bargaining 
model is used to analyze how the MMC and the processing plants bargain in order to 
establish an over order-premium at which to trade. The over-order premium plus the 
Class I price is the price paid by the processors (or received by the MMC).  10 
When there is a shortage of milk in the deficit months, the MMC imports milk 
from out-of-state producers and sells it to the processors along with the Florida produced 
milk. The average cost of importing milk (ACI) based on the total amount of milk sold to 
the Florida processors is  








where p i denotes the per hundredweight price that the MMC pays for importing milk 
which includes the price that the MMC pays out-of-state producers plus the transfer cost 
from out-of-state to the Florida processing plants; and qimp and qFl represent the MMC’s 
amount of imported milk and MMC’s member milk supply in hundredweight. The price 
per hundredweight received by the MMC is  
( 9 )        ACI p pMMC − = . 
To account for the cost of importing, the appropriate utility function of the risk-averse 
MMC is modeled as 
(10)      U . 
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However, the utility functions of the processor (Up) and the MMC’s utility and the 
processor’s utility when a breakdown occurs (i.e., Ubc and Ubp) remain unchanged. 
When both the MMC and processor are risk-averse, according to equation (7), the 
negotiated price p
N can be computed through  
(11)  0
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α . 11 
The only difference between equations (7) and (11) is the addition of variable ACI 
concerning situations in deficit periods. When ACI equals zero (e.g., in surplus periods), 
equations (7) and (11) are identical. 
Data 
The Federal Milk Marketing Order Administrator and Florida Milk Marketing 
Cooperative provided the data used in this study. The data include (1) the monthly 
historical over-order premiums; (2) the monthly Class I fluid milk price in the related 
areas; (3) the monthly hundredweights of fluid milk imported and exported during deficit 
and surplus periods (non-MMC producer milk); (4) costs per hundredweight paid by the 
MMC for fluid milk imported during deficit periods; (5) revenues per hundredweight 
received by the MMC for fluid milk sold to cheese, butter, and ice cream plants for 
surplus milk; and (6) the hauling cost per hundredweight that processors would pay if 
processing plants purchased their own milk. The time period for all of the data sets was 
from October 1998 to June 2002 (45 observations)
1. All milk prices, premiums, and other 
relevant costs are in dollars per hundredweight. In the following paragraphs, a detailed 
accounting of the required variables is presented.  
The monthly prices p
N the MMC received from the processing plants through the 
negotiation process equal the Class I fluid milk price in the Tampa area plus the 
announced over-order premium from the negotiation process. The revenues per 
hundredweight (pbc) the MMC would receive from selling milk to manufacturing plants if 
                                                 
1 Southeast Milk Inc. was created in October 1998 when the Florida Dairy Farmers 
Association and the Tampa Independent Dairy Farmers Association merged. The data 
used in this article is post merger. 12 
the bargaining process with the processing plant broke down, are calculated by dividing 
monthly revenues received for fluid milk sold to cheese, butter, and ice cream plants, by 
the quantity. The cost per hundredweight (pbp) the processing plants would pay for fluid 
milk if the bargaining process with the MMC broke down is assumed to be equal to the 
weighted average of the fluid milk price (Class I plus premiums) in the surplus areas (i.e., 
Baltimore, Detroit, Kansas City, and Philadelphia (the MMC’s unpublished paper)) plus 
the per hundredweight hauling costs from those areas. Finally, The average cost of 
importing milk ACI based on the total amount of milk sold to the Florida processors is 
calculated by dividing costs paid by the MMC for fluid milk imported (during deficit 
months) by the total hundredweight of milk, which was sold to the processing plants. By 
definition, ACI equals zero in the surplus period. 
Bargaining Power 
The averages of α and 1-α by month (table 1) obtained from the bargaining model 
when both parties are moderately risk-averse, represent the estimated bargaining power 
for each month. On average by month, α ranges from 0.624 in September to 0.970 in 
April and (1-α) ranges from 0.03 in April to 0.376 in September, all for the period from 
October 1998 through June 2002.  
Selection of the Risk Aversion Coefficient (θ ) 
The MMC and the bargaining processor were not surveyed to determine their level of risk 
averseness. This is sensitive information that could give the MMC or processor a 
competitive advantage. However, a selection of the suitable range for the Pratt-Arrow 
absolute risk aversion coefficient θ is important. If an unreasonably high level of θ is 13 
used, a firm could perform so risk-averse that this individual could not remain 
competitive. This might cause an unrealistic result in the model. On the other hand, if θ is 
too small, then the decision could be almost identical to the decision of a risk-neutral 
individual (Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman, 1993). The result from the decision-making 
model might be misunderstood to be unresponsive to the risk-attitude changes. 
  Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman (1993) used the risk premium to select ranges of 
θ. The risk premium is the difference between the expected return on the risky investment 
and the return on the riskless investment that leaves a firm indifferent between the two 
investments (Robinson and Barry, 1987). To select the appropriate range for θ, 
assumptions concerning the firms’ risk attitude and the size of the relevant gamble are 
necessary. Let’s consider an individual with certain (guaranteed) income w and random 
income z = (h, -h) with a probability of winning or losing equal to 0.5. The risk premium 
(i.e., Rp times h) associated with this setup is in 
(12)   [] [ ] ))]. )( ( ( exp[ ) ( exp( 5 . 0 ) ( exp( 5 . 0 h R w h w h w p − − − = − − − + + − − θ θ θ  
By solving equation (12), the proportional risk premium is  










The risk premium Rp(θ, h) is shown as a proportion of h and can be interpreted as the 
percentage of the h that one is willing to pay in order to eliminate the gamble or the 
possible loss of h. For example, an individual who is willing to pay 98% of the possible 
loss of h to stay out of the gamble game is classified as an extremely risk-averse person 
(Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman, 1993).  14 
  The size of the random income h is set to the standard deviation of a payoff to a 
player (Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman (1993) and Wang, Dorfman, McKissick, and 
Turner (2001)). Assuming that the only source of uncertainty is from the price risk, the 
standard deviation of the historically negotiated price (the class I price plus the over-
order premium) is used to represent the size of gamble h. The size of gamble h is equal to 
$1.84, the standard deviation of the negotiated price. 
Risk levels ranging from θ = 0.001 to θ = 2 produce proportional risk premiums 
ranging from 0.000091 to 0.8118 (table 2). The MMC or processor with θ = 0.001 is 
almost risk-neutral. The bargaining model with θ  < 0.001 provides a result virtually 
identical to that in a risk-neutral model. In comparison, the MMC with θ = 2 is willing to 
pay $1.494 (82 percent of the potential loss) for eliminating the potential gain or loss of 
$1.84. This is considered strongly risk-averse.
2 
The bargaining model used to calculate p
N is where the MMC and processor are 
risk-averse players with risk aversion coefficients (θc and θp) equaling 0.5. A θ equal 0.5 
provides the proportional risk premium of 0.4068 (i.e., pay 40.68 cents for avoiding to 
win or lose one dollar), implying moderate risk aversion (based on the subjective 
classification; Babcock, Choi and Feinerman (1993)). The use of the risk aversion 
coefficient θ equal to 0.5 in the bargaining model is assumed to be the benchmark in this 
article. 
 
                                                 
2 Wang, Dorfman, Mckissick, and Turner (2001) consider 90 percent of the potential loss to be 
extremely risk-averse. 15 
The Projection of Over-Order Premium 
The price of milk for fluid use in the U.S. has the minimum price set by the Federal Milk 
Marketing Order and is called the Class I price (ClassI). Thus, the terms of bargaining 
between the MMC and the processing plant involves an over-order premium which is the 
dollar amount above that monthly Class I price. The negotiated price (p
N) that the MMC 
(processor) receives (pays) for a given month is equal to the Class I price plus the over-
order premium. Hence, the over-order premium (PM) is  
(14)      .  ClassI p PM
N − =
The projected negotiated price p
N is computed from equation (11). Based on equations 
(11) and (14), the over-order premium (PM) can be calculated from the implicit equation 
(15)  
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Using equation (15), the projected over-order premiums are calculated using the SIML 
procedure in the econometric package Time Series Processor (TSP), version 4.4. The 
projected and historical over-order premiums are compared from October 1998 through 
June 2002 (table 3). 
The mean of the historical and projected premiums are not significantly different 
(2.543 and 2.497, table 3). The coefficient of variation indicates that the historical 




Sensitivity analysis shows how sensitive the over-order premium (PM) is, if a certain 
variable is changed, ceteris paribus. It was performed in four cases. First, the assumption 
on the revenues per hundredweight pbc is changed. Second, the assumption on the price 
per hundredweight pbp is altered. Third, the risk aversion degree for both the MMC and 
processor is changed. Finally, the bargaining power parameter is varied.  
Change in pbc 
The price per hundredweight pbc (the price that MMC would receive from selling milk if 
the bargaining process with the processor broke down) is one of variables used to 
compute the over-order premium (PM), ceteris paribus. Therefore, assume pbc changes 
from the benchmark pbc to the Atlanta pbc
3. The projected premiums using the Atlanta pbc 
and using the benchmark pbc are calculated using equation (15). 
The Altanta pbc is always higher than the benchmark pbc, except in August 2000 
through November 2000, August 2001, and September 2001. As a result, the projected 
premiums using the Altanta pbc is also higher than the projected premium using the 
benchmark  pbc, except in August 2000 through November 2000, August 2001. This 
means that the available market is very important to the bargaining process and its final 
outcome. 
                                                 
3The MMC might also be able to sell its fluid milk to other fluid milk markets. One 
possible scenario is that the MMC is able to sell all fluid milk to the processing plants in 
the Atlanta area if a bargaining breakdown occurs. Then, the price per hundredweight 
that the MMC would receive from selling fluid milk is the Atlanta Class I price plus 
Atlanta’s over-order premium minus a per hundredweight hauling cost. 17 
The mean of the projected premium for using the benchmark pbc is significantly 
smaller than the premium when using the Atlanta pbc (2.497 and 2.858, table 4). 
Furthermore, the coefficient of variation indicates that the projected premiums from using 
the benchmark pbc and the Atlanta pbc are almost equally volatile from month to month 
(0.120 and 0.123, table 4).  
Change in pbp 
The price per hundredweight pbp (what the processing plant would pay for fluid milk if 
the bargaining process with the MMC broke down) is one variable used to compute the 
over-order premium (PM). The purpose of this section is to investigate how the projected 
premium (PM) changes with respect to more expensive pbp. The projected premiums for 
the risk averse case (θc = θp = 0.5) along with (1) the benchmark pbp, (2) a one dollar 
more expensive pbp, and (3) a two dollar more expensive pbp are calculated (table 5). 
 When  pbp increases, the projected premium increases (table 5). The means of the 
projected over-order premiums are 2.497, 3.166, and 3.802 dollars per hundredweight for 
using the benchmark pbp, a one-dollar-higher pbp, and a two-dollar-higher pbp respectively 
(table 5). The difference between the projected premiums using the benchmark pbp and 
the one-dollar-higher pbp is 0.669 and between benchmark pbp and two-dollars-higher pbp 
is 1.305. This makes sense because if the price per hundredweight pbp increases then the 
premium will rise to reflect this outside market increase. 
Change in the risk aversion levels 
The size of the absolute risk aversion coefficient θc and θp represents the level of risk 
aversion belonging to the MMC and the processor. The objective of this section is to see 18 
how the projected premium (PM) changes with respect to changes in the level of risk 
aversion for both parties, ceteris paribus. 
The projected over-order premiums when (1) the MMC is almost risk-neutral (i.e., 
θc = 0.001) and the processor is moderately risk-averse (i.e., θp = 0.5) and (2) the MMC is 
moderately risk averse (i.e., θc = 0.5) and the processor is almost risk-neutral (i.e., θp = 
0.001) are calculated and are compared with the projected premium obtained from the 
benchmark case (i.e., θc and θp = 0.5).  
Every value of the projected over-order premium obtained when the MMC is 
almost risk-neutral (i.e., θc = 0.001) and the processor is moderately risk-averse (i.e., θp = 
0.5) is higher than that obtained from the benchmark model when both the MMC and 
processor are moderately risk-averse (θc and θp = 0.5). The MMC receives (the processor 
pays) a higher over-order premium as the MMC becomes less risk-averse, ceteris paribus. 
The means are 3.084 and 2.497 dollars per hundredweight (table 6). 
The opposite is true for the projected over-order premium when the MMC is 
moderately risk-averse (i.e., θc = 0.5) and the processor is almost risk-neutral (i.e., θp = 
0.001). Every value of the projected premium is lower than that obtained from the 
benchmark model (figure 4). The MMC receives (the processor pays) a lower over-order 
premium as the processor becomes less risk-averse, ceteris paribus. The means are 2.497 
and 2.331 dollars per hundredweight (table 6). 
When the MMC is almost risk-neutral and the processor is moderately risk-averse 
(i.e., θc= 0.001 and θp = 0.5), the average projected premium goes up 0.587 (i.e., 3.084-
2.497) dollars per hundredweight from the average benchmark premium (table 6). When 19 
the MMC is moderately risk-averse and the processor is almost risk-neutral, the average 
projected premium declines only 0.166 (2.331-2.497) dollars per hundredweight from the 
average benchmark premium (table 6). The asymmetric change in the premium results 
from the bargaining power for the MMC, which is higher than the power for the 
processor (i.e., 0.89 and 0.11 on average). Therefore, the risk aversion of the MMC has 
more impact on the projected premium than the risk aversion of the processor, ceteris 
paribus. 
Change in the bargaining power 
The bargaining power for the MMC and the processor should affect the projected 
over-order premium. The projected over-order premium when both the MMC and 
processor are risk-averse (θc and θp = 0.5) with different levels of bargaining power is 
calculated using equation (15), while holding other variables constant. The means of the 
projected premiums when the MMC and processor are risk-averse with (1) the 
benchmark bargaining power, (2) α ten percent lower, (3) α twenty percent lower, and 
(4) α thirty percent lower are 2.497, 1.888, 1.513, and 1.214 respectively (table 7). As the 
bargaining power for the MMC (the processor) declines (inclines), the projected over-
order premium the MMC receives (the processor pays) drops, ceteris paribus.  
The difference between the projected over-order premiums with two different 
bargaining power parameters is smaller as the margin between the upper limit pbp and the 
lower limit pbc minus ACI ( pbp - pbc -  ACI) is smaller. For example, the difference 
between the projected premium for the benchmark bargaining power and the thirty-
percent-lower bargaining power (for the MMC) is very narrow in October 1998, 20 
September 1999, September 2000, and September 2001 when the margin between the 
upper limit pbp and the lower limit pbc minus ACI reaches its trough. The smaller the 
margin between the upper limit pbp and the lower limit pbc minus ACI, the narrower the 
bargaining range and the less the impact of the bargaining power on the projected over-
order premium.  
Summary 
The MMC negotiates with processors for the price to pay farmers by the processors. The 
price of milk for fluid use in Florida has a price floor set by the Milk Marketing Order 
called the Class I price. Therefore, the MMC and the processors bargain over the dollar 
amount above the Class I price in any given month. Certainly, the Florida farmers and the 
MMC prefer to receive high over-order premiums. Conversely, the Florida processors 
would like to pay low premiums. In general, a cooperative of a given commodity usually 
negotiates with several processors (Iskow and Sexton, 1991). However, the MMC usually 
negotiates for an over-order premium with a leading processor and the agreement with 
other processors are equal or very close to the first determined premium. This structure 
indicates an approximate bilateral monopoly. This structure allows us to use the bilateral 
bargaining model to analyze the bargaining process between the MMC and a group of 
processors.  
The projected over-order premium is calculated by subtracting the Class I price 
from the negotiated price. By using the monthly average bargaining power when both the 
MMC and processor are moderately risk-averse (θc = θp = 0.5), the projected over-order 
premium ranges from $1.82 per hundredweight in November 1999 to $3.10 in November 21 
2000. On average, the projected over-order premium is $0.046 per hundredweight lower 
than the actual over-order premium ($2.497 and $2.543 per hundredweight on average). 
Furthermore, while holding α, the upper limit (pbp), the risk levels (θc = θp), and the ACI 
constant, an increase (decrease) in pbc results in a rise (decline) in the projected over-
order premium. The same is true for a change in pbp. An increase (decrease) in pbp causes 
a rise (decline) in the projected over-order premium. 
  The empirical results from the bargaining model indicate that the MMC 
constantly has higher bargaining power than does the processor (table 1). There are two 
reasons to support the finding that MMC has higher bargaining power. First, the price for 
milk sold to a manufacturing plant (the lower limit) is always much lower than the price 
for fluid use. Therefore, the MMC receives the negotiated milk price (Class I plus over-
order premium) for fluid use, which is higher than the price for manufacturing use (the 
lower limit pbc). Second, the actual negotiated milk price is closer to the upper limit (pbp) 
than to the lower limit. Thus, the bargaining power depends mainly on the lower limit, 
upper limit and the margin between them. 
Finally, the projected over-order premium is higher (lower) as either pbc or pbp, 
caused by outside market forces, increases (declines), ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the 
projected over-order premium is higher (lower) as the MMC (processor) becomes less 
risk-averse, ceteris paribus. The bargaining power has an impact on the projected over-
order premium as well. The projected over-order premium the MMC receives (the 
processor pays) drops as the bargaining power for the MMC (the processor) declines 
(rises), ceteris paribus.  22 
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Table 1. The Average and Standard Deviation by Month of the Bargaining Power α 
and 1-α for the MMC and Processor when both the MMC and the Processor are 
Risk-Averse (with θc = θp = 0.5) October 1998 through June 2002
a. 
Month  α  1-α  Standard Deviation  Number of Observations 
January 0.965  0.035  0.011  4 
February 0.967  0.033  0.017  4 
March 0.956 0.044  0.028  4 
April 0.970  0.030  0.017  4 
May 0.951  0.049  0.029  4 
June 0.937  0.063  0.034  4 
July 0.945  0.055  0.018  3 
August 0.655 0.345  0.224  3 
September 0.624  0.376  0.278  3 
October 0.758  0.242  0.084  4 
November 0.902  0.098  0.098  4 
December 0.937  0.063  0.083  4 
a calculated by solving equation (11) for α and using the monthly values of p
N and the 
other related variables as parameters. The equation is  
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Table 2. The Risk Aversion Coefficient θ and Implied Risk Premium Rp(θ, h) for the 
$1.84 Gamble Size. 
θ  Proportional Risk Premium Rp(θ, h)  Premium in Dollars 
0.001 0.00092  $0.002 
0.01 0.00920  $0.017 
0.1 0.09149  $0.168 
0.3 0.26303  $0.484 
0.5 0.40680  $0.749 
0.8 0.56397  $1.038 
1 0.63683  $1.172 
1.5 0.75031  $1.381 
2 0.81182  $1.494 25 
Table 3. The Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation of the 
Historical Over-Order Premium and the Projected Over-Order Premium when the 
MMC and Processor are Risk-Averse (with θc = θp = 0.5), October 1998 through 
June 2002. 
 
The Actual Over-Order Premium
  





Standard Deviation  0.339  0.298 
Coefficient of Variation  0.133  0.120 
aUsed to test the hypothesis that the means of the premiums are not significantly 
different. Failed to reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
Table 4. The Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation of the 
Projected Over-Order Premium when the MMC and Processor are Risk-Averse 
(with θc = θp = 0.5) with the Benchmark pbc and the Atlanta pbc, October 1998 
through June 2002. 
  The Projected Over-Order Premiums (Dollars per Hundredweight) 




Standard Deviation  0.298  0.352 
Coefficient of Variation  0.120  0.123 
aUsed to test the hypothesis that the means of the premiums are significantly different. 
Reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 26 
Table 5. The Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation of the 
Projected Over-Order Premium when the MMC and Processor are Risk-Averse 
(with θc = θp = 0.5) with (1) the Benchmark pbp, (2) One-Dollar-Higher pbp, and (3) 
two-Dollar-Higher pbp, October 1998 through June 2002. 
  The Projected Over-Order Premiums (Dollars per Hundredweight) 





Standard Deviation  0.298  0.315  0.335 
Coefficient of Variation  0.120  0.099  0.088 
aUsed to test the hypothesis that the means of the premiums are significantly different. 
Reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
bUsed to test the hypothesis that the means of the premiums are significantly different. 
Reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 6. The Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation of the 
Projected Over-Order Premium when (1) the MMC is Almost Risk-Neutral and the 
Processor is Moderately Risk-Averse (θc= 0.001 and θp = 0.5), (2) the MMC and the 
Processor are Moderately Risk-Averse (the Benchmark with θc and θp = 0.5), and (3) 
the MMC is Moderately Risk-Averse and the Processor is Almost Risk-Neutral (θc = 
0.001 and θp = 0.5), October 1998 through June 2002. 
  The Projected Over-Order Premiums (Dollars per Hundredweight) 





Standard  Deviation  0.388 0.298 0.343 
Coefficient of Variation  0.126  0.120  0.147 
aUsed to test the hypothesis that the means of the premiums are significantly different. 
Reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
bUsed to test the hypothesis that the means of the premiums are significantly different. 
Reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
 27 
Table 7. The Mean, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation of the 
Projected Over-Order Premium when the MMC and Processor are Rsk-Averse (θc 
and θp = 0.5) with the Bargaining Power (α) for the MMC at (1) the Benchmark 
Level, (2) the Ten Percent Lower, (3) the Twenty Percent Lower, and (4) the Thirty 
Percent Lower, October 1998 through June 2002. 















Standard  Deviation  0.298 0.411 0.531 0.626 
Coefficient of 
Variation  0.120 0.218 0.351 0.515 
aUsed to test the hypothesis that the means of the premiums are significantly different. 
Reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
bUsed to test the hypothesis that the means of the premiums are significantly different. 
Reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
cUsed to test the hypothesis that the means of the premiums are significantly different. 
Reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
 